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liender 
Display 
I Take it that the function of ceremony reaches in two directions, the affirmation of basic social arrangements 
and the presentation of ultimate doctrines about man and 
the world. Typically these celebrations are performed either 
by persons acting to one another or acting in concert before 
a congregation. So "social situations" are involved-defining 
these simply as physical arenas anywhere within which 
persons present are in perceptual range of one another, 
subject to mutual monitoring-the persons themselves being 
definable solely on this ground as a "gathering." 
It is in social situations, then, that materials for celebra-
tive work must be found~ materials which can be shaped into 
a palpable representation of matters not otherwise packaged 
for the eye and the ear and the moment. And found they are. 
The divisions and hierarchies of social structure are depicted 
microecologically, that is, through the use of small-scale 
spatial metaphors. Mythic historic events are played through 
in a condensed and idealized version. Apparent junctures or 
turning points in life are solemnized, as in christenings, 
graduation exercises, marriage ceremonies, and funerals. 
Social relationships are addressed by greetings and farewells. 
Seasonal cycles are given dramatized boundaries. Reunions 
are held. Annual vacations and, on a lesser scale, outings on 
weekends and evenings are assayed, bringing immersion in 
ideal settings. Dinners and parties are given, becoming 
occasions for the expenditure of resources at a rate that is 
above one's mundane self. Moments of festivity are attached 
to the acquisition of new possessions. 
In all of these ways, a situated social fuss is made over 
what might ordinarily be hidden in extended courses of 
activity and the unformulated experience of their par-
ticipants; in brief, the individual is given an opportunity to 
face directly a representation, a somewhat iconic expression, 
a mock-up of what he is supposed to hold dear, a 
presentation of the supposed ordering of his existence. 
A single, fixed element of a ceremony can be called a 
"ritual"; the interpersonal kind can be defined as perfunc-
tory, conventionalized acts through which one individual 
portrays his regard for another to that other. 
II If Durkheim leads us to consider one sense of the term ritualization, Darwin, in his Expression of Emotion in 
Man and Animals, leads us, coincidentally, to consider quite 
another. To paraphrase Julian Huxley (and the ethological 
position}, the basic argument is that under the pressure of 
natural selection certain emotionally motivated behaviors 
become formalized - in the sense of becoming simplified, 
exaggerated, and stereotyped-and loosened from any 
specific context of releasers, and all this so that, in effect, 
there will be more efficient signalling, both inter- and 
intra-specifically. 1 These behaviors are "displays," a species-
utilitarian notion that is at the heart of the ethological 
conception of communication. Instead of having to play out 
an act, the animal, in effect, provides a readily readable 
expression of his situation, speG:ifically his intent, this taking 
the form of a "ritualization" of some portion of the act 
itself, and this indication (whether promise or threat} 
presumably allows for the negotiation of an efficient 
response from, and to, witnesses of the display. (If Darwin 
leads here, John Dewey, and G. H. Mead are not far behind.} 
The ethological concern, then, does not take us back from 
a ritual performance to the social structure and ultimate 
beliefs in which the performer and witness are embedded, 
but forward into the unfolding course of socially situated 
events. Displays thus provide evidence of the actor's align-
ment in a gathering, the position he seems prepared to take 
up in what is about to happen in the social situation. 
Alignments tentatively or indicatively establish the terms of 
the contact, the mode or style or formula for the dealings 
that are to ensue among the individuals in the situation. As 
suggested, ethologists tend to use the term communication 
here, but that might be loose talk. Displays don't communi-
cate in the narrow sense of the term; they don't enunciate 
something through a language of symbols openly established 
and used solely for that purpose. They provide evidence of 
the actor's alignment in the situation. And displays are 
important insofar as alignments are. 
A version of display for humans would go something like 
this: Assume all of an individual's behavior and appearance 
informs those who witness him, minimally telling them 
something about his social identity, about his mood, intent, 
and expectations, and about the state of his relation to them. 
In every culture a distinctive range of this indicative behavior 
and appearance becomes specialized so as to more routinely 
and perhaps more effectively perform this informing 
function, the informing coming to be the controlling role of 
the performance, although often not avowedly so. One can 
call these indicative events displays. As suggested, they 
tentatively establish the terms of the contact, the mode or 
style or formula for the dealings that are to ensue between 
the persons providing the display and the persons perceiving 
it. 
Finally, our special concern: If gender be defined as the 
culturally established correlates of sex (whether in con-
sequence of biology or learning}, then gender display refers 
to conventionalized portrayals of these correlates. 
Ill What can be said about the structure of ritual-like displays? 
(1) Displays very often have a dialogic character of a 
statement-reply kind, with an expression on the part of one 
individual calling forth an expression on the part of another, 
1 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 
Series B, No. 772, Vol. 251 {Dec. 29, 1966), p. 250. 
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the latter expression being understood to be a response to 
the first. 
These statement-response pairs can be classified in an 
obvious way. There are symmetrical and asymmetrical pairs: 
mutual first-naming is a symmetrical pair, first-name/sir is an 
asymmetrical one. Of asymmetrical pairs, some are dyadical-
ly reversible, some not: the greetings between guest and host, 
asymmetrical in themselves, may be reversed between these 
two persons on another occasion; first-name/title, on the 
other hand, ordinarily is not reversible. Of dyadically 
irreversible pairs of rituals, some pair parts are exclusive, 
some not: the civilian title a male may extend a female is 
never extended to him; on the other hand, the "Sir" a man 
receives from a subordinate in exchange for first-name, he 
himself is likely to extend to his superordinate in exchange 
for first-name, an illustration of the great chain of corporate 
being. 
Observe that a symmetrical display between two individ-
uals can involve asymmetries according to which of the two 
initially introduced the usage between them, and which of 
the two begins his part of the mutual display first on any 
occasion of use. 
And symmetry (or asymmetry) itself can be misleading. 
One must consider not only how two individuals ritually 
treat each other, but also how they separately treat, and are 
treated by, a common third. Thus the point about sym-
metrical greetings and farewells extended between a male and 
a close female friend is that he is very likely to extend a 
different set, albeit equally symmetrical, to her husband, and 
she, similarly, a yet different symmetrical set to his wife. 
Indeed, so deeply does the male-female difference inform our 
ceremonial life that one finds here a very systematic 
"opposite number" arrangement. For every courtesy, 
symmetrical or asymmetrical, that a woman shows to almost 
anyone, there will be a parallel one- seen to be the same, yet 
different- which her brother or husband shows to the same 
person. 
(2) Given that individuals have work to do in social 
situations, the question arises as to how ritual can accom-
modate to what is thus otherwise occurring. Two basic 
patterns seem to appear. First, display seems to be con-
centrated at beginnings and endings of purposeful under-
takings, that is, at junctures, so that, in effect, the activity 
itself is not interfered with. (Thus the small courtesies 
sometimes performed in our society by men to women when 
the latter must undergo what can be defined as a slight 
change in physical state, as in getting up, sitting down, 
entering a room or leaving it, beginning to smoke or ceasing 
to, moving indoors or outdoors, suffering increased tempera-
ture or less, and so forth.) Here one might speak of "bracket 
rituals." Second, some rituals seem designed to be continued 
as a single note across a strip of otherwise intended activity 
without displacing that activity itself. (Thus the basic 
military courtesy of standing at attention throughout the 
course of an encounter with a superior- in contrast to the 
salute, this latter clearly a bracket ritual.) One can speak here 
of a "ritual transfix" or "overlay." Observe that by combin-
ing these two locations- brackets and overlays- one has, for 
any strip of activity, a schedule of displays. Although these 
rituals will tend to be perceived as coloring the whole of the 
scene, in fact, of course, they only occur selectively in it. 
(3) It is plain that if an individual is to give and receive 
what is considered his ritual due in social situations, then he 
must-whether by intent or in effect- style himself so that 
others present can immediately know the social (and 
sometimes the personal) identity of he who is to be dealt 
with; and in turn he must be able to acquire this information 
about those he thus informs. Some displays seem to be 
specialized for this identificatory, early-warning function: in 
the case of gender, hair style, clothing, and tone of voice. 
(Handwriting similarly serves in the situation-like contacts 
conducted through the mails; name also so serves, in addition 
to serving in the management of persons who are present 
only in reference.) It can be argued that although ritualized 
behavior in social situations may markedly change over time, 
especially in connection with politicization, identificatory 
stylings will be least subject to change. 
(4) There is no doubt that displays can be, and are likely 
to be, multivocal or polysemic, in the sense that more than 
one piece of social information may be encoded in them. 
(For example, our terms of address typically record sex of 
recipient and also properties of the relationship between 
speaker and spoken to. So, too, in occupational titles 
["agentives"]. In the principal European languages, typically 
a masculine form is the unmarked case; the feminine is 
managed with a suffix which, in addition, often carries a 
connotation of incompetence, facetiousness, and inex-
perience.2) Along with this complication goes another. Not 
only does one find that recognition of different statuses can 
be encoded in the same display, but also that a hierarchy of 
considerations may be found which are addressed sequential-
ly. For example, when awards are given out, a male official 
may first give the medal, diploma, prize, or whatever, and 
then shake the hand of the recipient, thus shifting from that 
of an organization's representative bestowing an official sign 
of regard on a soldier, colleague, fellow citizen, etc., to a man 
showing regard for another, the shift in action associated 
with a sharply altered facial expression. This seems nicely 
confirmed when the recipient is a woman. For then the 
second display can be a social kiss. When Admiral Elmo R. 
Zumwalt, then chief of U.S. naval operations, officiated in 
the ceremony in which Alene Duerk became the first female 
admiral in the U.S. Navy's history (as director of the Navy 
Nurse Corps), he added to what was done by kissing her full 
on the lips. 3 So, too, a female harpist after just completing 
Ginastera's Harp Concerto, and having just shaken the hand 
of the conductor (as would a male soloist), is free (as a male 
is not) to strike an additional note by leaning over and giving 
the conductor a kiss on the cheek. Similarly, the applause she 
receives will be her due as a musician, but the flowers that 
are brought onstage a moment after speak to something that 
would not be spoken to in a male soloist. And the reverse 
sequence is possible. I have seen a well-bred father raise his 
hat on first meeting his daughter after a two-year absence, 
then bend and kiss her. (The hat-raise denoted the relation-
ship between the sexes-presumably "any lady" would have 
induced it- the kiss, the relation between kin.) 
(5) Displays vary quite considerably in the degree of their 
2 See the thorough treatment of "feminizers" in Conners (1971 ). 
3 /nternationa/ Herald Tribune, june 3-4, 1972. 
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formalization. Some, like salutes, are specified as to form and 
occasion of occurrence, and failure to so behave can lead to 
specific sanctions; others are so much taken for granted that 
it awaits a student of some kind to explicate what everyone 
knows (but not consciously), and failure to perform leads to 
nothing more than diffuse unease and a search for speakable 
reasons to be ill-tempered with the offender. 
(6) The kind of displays I will be concerned with-gender 
displays-have a related feature: their apparent optionality. 
In the case, for example, of male courtesies, often a 
particu lar display need not be initiated; if initiated, it need 
not be accepted, but can be politely declined. Finally, when 
failure to perform occurs, irony, nudging, and joking 
complaint, etc., can result- sometimes more as an 
opportunity for a sally than as a means of social control. 
Correlated with this basis of looseness is another: for each 
display there is likely to be a set of functional equivalents 
wherewith something of the display's effect can be accom-
plished by alternative niceties. At work, too, is the very 
process of ritualization. A recipient who declines an 
incipient gesture of deference has waited until the intending 
giver has shown his desire to perform it; the more the latter 
can come to count on this foreclosure of his move, the more 
his show of intent can itself come to displace the unfolded 
form. 
(7) Ordinarily displays do not in fact provide a repre-
sentation in the round of a specific social relationship but 
rather of broad groupings of them. For example, a social kiss 
may be employed by kin-related persons or cross-sex friends, 
and the details of the behavior itself may not inform as to 
which relationship is being celebrated. Similarly, precedence 
through a door is available to mark organizational rank, but 
the same indulgence is accorded guests of an establishment, 
the dependently young, the aged and infirm, indeed, those of 
unquestionably strong social position and those (by inversion 
courtesy) of unquestionably weak position. A picture, then, 
of the relationship between any two persons can hardly be 
obtained through an examination of the displays they extend 
each other on any one type of occasion; one would have to 
assemble these niceties across all the mutually identifying 
types of contacts that the pair has. 
There is a loose gearing, then, between social structures 
and what goes on in particular occasions of ritual expression. 
This can further be seen by examining the abstract ordinal 
format which is commonly generated within social situations. 
Participants, for example, are often displayed in rankable 
order with respect to some visible property-looks, height, 
elevation, closeness to the center, elaborateness of costume, 
temporal precedence, and so forth-and the comparisons are 
somehow taken as a reminder of differential social position, 
the differences in social distance between various positions 
and the specific character of the positions being lost from 
view. Thus, the basic forms of deference provide a peculiarly 
limited version of the social universe, telling us more, 
perhaps, about the special depictive resources of social 
situations than about the structures presumably expressed 
thereby. 
(8) People, unlike other animals, can be quite conscious 
of the displays they employ and are able to perform many of 
them by design in contexts of their own choosing. Thus 
instead of merely "displacing" an act (in the sense described 
by ethologists), the human actor may wait until he is out of 
the direct line of sight of a putative recipient, and then 
engage in a portrayal of attitude to him that is only then safe 
to perform, the performance done for the benefit of the 
performer himself or third parties. In turn, the recipient of 
such a display (or rather the target of it) may actively 
collaborate, fostering the impression that the act has escaped 
him even though it hasn't- and sometimes evidentally so. 
(There is the paradox, then, that what is done for revealment 
can be partially concealed.) More important, once a display 
becomes well established in a particular sequence of actions, 
a section of the sequence can be lifted out of its original 
context, parenthesized, and used in a quotative way, a 
postural resource for mimicry, mockery, irony, teasing, and 
other sportive intents, including, very commonly, the depic-
tion of make-believe scenes in advertisements. Here styliza-
tion itself becomes an object of attention, the actor 
providing a comment on this process in the very act through 
which he unseriously realizes it. What was a ritual becomes 
itself ritualized, a transformation of what is already a 
transformation, a "hyper-ritualization." Thus, the human use 
of displays is complicated by the human capacity for 
reframing behavior. 
In sum, then, how a relationship is portrayed through 
ritual can provide an imbalanced, even distorted, view of the 
relationship itself. When this fact is seen in the light of 
another, namely, that displays tend to be scheduled accom-
modatively during an activity so as not to interfere with its 
execution, it becomes even more clear that the version ritual 
gives us of social reality is only that- not a picture of the way 
things are but a passing exhortative guide to perception. 
IV Displays are part of what we think of as "expressive behavior," and as such tend to be conveyed and 
received as if they were somehow natural, deriving, like 
temperature and pulse, from the way people are and needful, 
therefore, of no social or historical analysis. But, of course, 
ritualized expressions are as needful of historical understand-
ing as is the Ford car. Given the expressive practices we 
employ, one may ask: Where do these displays come from? 
If, in particular, there are behavioral styles- codings- that 
distinguish the way men and women partjcipate in social 
situations, then the question should be put concerning the 
origins and sources of these styles. The materials and 
ingredients can come directly from the resources available in 
particular social settings, but that still leaves open the 
question of where the formulating of these ingredients, their 
styling, comes from. 
The most prominent account of the origins of our gender 
displays is, of course, the biological. Gender is assumed to be 
an extension of our animal natures, and just as animals 
express their sex, so does man: innate elements are said to 
account for the behavior in both cases. And indeed, the 
means by which we initially establish an individual in one of 
the two sex classes and confirm this location in its later years 
can and are used as a means of placement in the management 
of domestic animals. However, although the signs for 
establishing placement are expressive of matters biological, 
why we should think of these matters as essential and central 
is a cultural matter. More important, where behavioral gender 
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display does draw on animal life, it seems to do so not, or 
not merely, in a direct evolutionary sense but as a source of 
imagery- a cultural resource. The animal kingdom- or at least 
certain select parts of it- provides us (1 argue) with mimetic 
models for gender display, not necessarily phylogenetic ones. 
Thus, in Western society, the dog has served us as an ultimate 
model of fawning, of bristling, and (with baring of fangs) of 
threatening; the horse a model, to be sure, of physical 
strength, but of little that is interpersonal and interactional.4 
Once one sees that animal life, and lore concerning that 
life, provides a cultural source of imagery for gender display, 
the way is open to examine other sources of display imagery, 
but now models for mimicry that are closer to home. Of 
considerable significance, for example, is the complex as-
sociated with European court life and the doctrines of the 
gentleman, especially as these came to be incorporated (and 
modified) in military etiquette. Although the force of this 
style is perhaps declining, it was, I think, of very real 
importance until the second World War, especially in British 
influenced countries and especially, of course, in dealings 
between males. For example, the standing-at-attention pos-
ture as a means of expressing being on call, the "Sir" 
response, and even the salute, became part of the deference 
style far beyond scenes from military life. 
For our purposes, there is a source of display much more 
relevant than animal lore or military tradition, a source closer 
to home, a source, indeed, right in the ho rrf; : the ,parent-
child relationship. 
V The parent-child complex- taken in jts ideal middle-class version- has some very special features when 
considered as a source of behavioral imagery. First, most 
persons end up having been children cared for by parents 
and/or elder sibs, and as parents (or elder sibs) in the reverse 
position. So both sexes experience both roles- a sex-free 
resource. (The person playing the role opposite the child is a 
mother or older sister as much or more than a father or elder 
brother. Half of those in the child role will be male, and the 
housewife role, the one we used to think was ideally suitable 
for females, contains lots of parental elements.) Second, 
given inheritance and residence patterns, parents are the only 
authority in our society that can rightly be said to be both 
temporary and exerted "in the best interests" of those 
subordinated thereby. To speak here-at least in our Western 
society- of the child giving something of equivalence in 
exchange for the rearing that he gets is ludicrous. There is no 
appreciable quid pro quo. Balance lies elsewhere. What is 
received in one generation is given in the next. It should be 
added that this important unselfseeking possibility has been 
4 
An important work here, of course, is Darwin's Expression of 
Emotions in Man and Animals. In this treatise a direct parallel is 
drawn, in words and pictures, between a few gestures of a few 
animals- gestures expressing, for example, dominance, appeasement, 
fear-and the same expressions as portrayed by actors. This study, 
:e~entl~ and rightly resurrected as a classic in ethology {for indeed, it 
IS 1n th1s book that displays are first studied in detail in everything but 
name), is generally taken as an elucidation of our animal natures and 
the expressions we consequently share with them. Now the book is 
also functioning as a source in its own right of cultural beliefs 
concerning the character and origins of alignment expressions. 
much neglected by students of society. The established 
imagery is economic and Hobbesian, turning on the notion of 
social exchange, and the newer voices have been concerned 
to show how parental authority can be misguided, oppres-
sive, and ineffective. 
Now I want to argue that parent-child dealings carry 
special value as a means of orienting the student to the 
significance of social situations as a unit of social organiza-
tion. For a great deal of what a child is privileged to do and a 
great deal of what he must suffer his parents doing on his 
behalf pertains to how adults in our society come to manage 
themselves in social situations. Surprisingly the key issue 
becomes this: What mode of handling ourselves do we 
employ in social situations as our means of demonstrating 
respectful orientation to them and of maintaining guarded-
ness within them? 
It might be useful, then, to outline schematically the ideal 
middle-class parent-child relationship, limiting this to what 
can occur when a child and parent are present in the same 
social situation. 
It seems to be assumed that the child comes to a social 
situation with all its "basic" needs satisfied and/or provided 
for, and that there is no good reason why he himself should 
be planning and thinking very far into the future. It is as 
though the child were on holiday. 
There is what might be called orientation license. The 
child is tolerated in his drifting from the situation into 
aways, fugues, brown studies, and the like. There is license to 
flood out, as in dissolving into tears, capsizing into laughter, 
bursting into glee, and the like. 
Related to this license is another, namely, the use of 
patently ineffective means to effect an end, the means 
expressing a desire to escape, cope, etc., but not possibly 
achieving its end. One example is the child's hiding in or 
behind pare.nts, or (in its more attenuated form) behind his 
own hand, thereby cutting his eyes off from any threat but 
not the part of him that is threatened. Another is "pum-
meling," the kind of attack which is a half-serious joke, a use 
of considerable force but against an adversary that one 
knows to be impervious to such an effort, so that what starts 
with an instrumental effort ends up an admittedly defeated 
gesture. In all of this one has nice examples of ritualization in 
the classical ethological sense. And an analysis of what it is to 
act childishly. 
Next, protective intercession by parents. High things, 
intricate things, heavy things, are obtained for the child. 
Dangerous things-chemical, electrical, mechanical- are kept 
from him. Breakable things are managed for him. Contacts 
with the adult world are mediated, providing a buffer 
between the child and surrounding persons. Adults who are 
present generally modulate talk that must deal with harsh 
things of this world: discussion of business, money, and sex 
is censored; cursing is inhibited; gossip diluted. 
There are indulgence priorities: precedence through doors 
and onto life rafts is given the child; if there are sweets to 
distribute, he gets them first. 
There is the notion of the erasability of offense. Having 
done something wrong, the child merely cries and otherwise 
shows contrition, after which he can begin afresh as though 
the slate had been washed clean. His immediate emotional 
_response to being called to task need only be full enough and 
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it will be taken as final payment for the delict. He can also 
assume that love will not be discontinued because of what he 
has done, providing only that he shows how broken up he is 
because of doing it. 
There is an obvious generalization behind all these forms 
of license and privilege. A loving protector is standing by in 
the wings, allowing not so much for dependency as a copping 
out of, or relief from, the "realities," that is, the necessities 
and constraints to which adults in social situations are 
subject. In the deepest sense, then, middle-class children are 
not engaged in adjusting to and adapting to social situations, 
but in practicing, trying out, or playing at these efforts. 
Reality for them is deeply forgiving. 
Note, if a child is to be able to call upon these various 
reliefs from realities, then, of course, he must stay within 
range of a distress cry, or within view- scamper-back dis-
tance. And, of course, in all of this, parents are provided 
scenes in which they can act out their parenthood. 
You will note that there is an obvious price that the child 
must pay for being saved from seriousness. 
He is subjected to control by physical fiat and to 
commands serving as a lively reminder thereof: forced 
rescues from oncoming traffic and from potential falls; 
forced care, as when his coat is buttoned and mittens pulled 
on against his protest. In general, the child's doings are 
unceremoniously interrupted under warrant of ensuring that 
they are executed safely. .. .. ~,·; · ...... .... ·~"f· , ::.;,...;...... · • 
He is subjected to various ·forms-ofnohpers-o·n~ treatment. 
He is talked past and talked about as though absent. Gestures 
of affection and attention are performed "directly," without 
engaging him in verbal interaction through the same acts. 
Teasing and taunting occur, dealings which start out in-
volving the child as a coparticipant in talk and end up 
treating him merely as a target of attention. 
His inward thoughts, feelings, and recollections are not 
treated as though he had informational rights in their 
disclosure. He can be queried on contact about his desires 
and intent, his aches and pains, his resentments and 
gratitude, in short, his subjective situation, but he cannot go 
very far in reciprocating this sympathetic curiosity without 
being thought intrusive. 
Finally, the child's time and territory may be seen as 
expendable. He may be sent on errands or to fetch something 
in spite of what he is doing at the time; he may be caused to 
give up territorial prerogatives because of the needs of adults. 
Now note that an important feature of the child's 
situation in life is that the way his parents interact with him 
tends to be employed to him by other adults also, extending 
to nonparental kinsmen, acquainted nankin, and even to 
adults with whom he is unacquainted. (It is as though the 
world were in the military uniform of one army, and all 
adults were its officers.) Thus a child in patent need provides 
an unacquainted adult a right and even an obligation to offer 
help, providing only that no other close adult seems to be in 
charge. 
Given this parent-child complex as a common fund of 
experience, it seems we draw on it in a fundamental way in 
adult social gatherings. The invocation through ritualistic 
expression of this hierarchical complex seems to cast a spate 
of face-to-face interaction in what is taken as no-contest 
terms, warmed by a touch of relatedness; in short, benign 
control. The superordinate gives something gratis out of 
supportive identification, and the subordinate responds with 
an outright display of gratitude, and if not that, then at least 
an implied submission to the relationship and the definition 
of the situation it sustains. 
One afternoon an officer was given a call for illegal parking in a 
commercial area well off his sector. He was fairly new in the 
district, and it took him awhile to find the address. When he 
arrived he saw a car parked in an obviously dangerous and illegal 
manner at the corner of a small street. He took out his ticket book 
and wrote it up. As he was placing the ticket on the car, a man 
came out of the store on the corner. He approached and asked 
whether the officer had come in answer to his call. When the 
patrolman said that he had, the man replied that the car which had 
been bothering him had already left and he hoped the patrolman 
was not going to tag his car. "Hey, I'm sorry, pal but it's already 
written." 
"I expected Officer Reno, he's usually on 6515 car. I'd 
appreciate it, Officer, if next time you would stop in before you 
write them up." The patrolman was slightly confused .... 
He said politely and frankly, "Mister, how would it look if I 
went into every store before I wrote up a ticket and asked if it was 
all right? What would people think I was doing?" The man 
shrugged his shoulders and smiled. "You're right, son. O.K., forget 
it. Listen stop in sometime if I can help you with something." He 
patted the patrolman on the shoulder and returned to his business 
[Rubinstein 1973:161-162f. 
Or the subordinate initiates a sign of helplessness and need, 
and the superordinate responds with a volunteered service. A 
Time magazine story on female police might be cited as an 
illustration: 
Those [policewomen] who are there already have provided a 
devastating new weapon to the police crime-fighting arsenal, one 
that has helped women to get their men for centuries. It worked 
well for diminutive Patrolwoman Ina Sheperd after she collared a 
muscular shoplifter in Miami last December and discovered that 
there were no other cops- or even a telephone-around. Unable to 
summon help, she burst into tears. "If I don't bring you in, I'll 
lose my job," she sobbed to her prisoner, who chivalrously 
accompanied her until a squad car could be found. 5 
It turns out, then, that in our society whenever a male has 
dealings with a female or a subordinate male (especially a 
younger one), some mitigation of potential distance, 
coercion, and hostility is quite likely to be induced by 
application of the parent-child complex. Which implies that, 
ritually speaking, females are equivalent to subordinate males 
and both are equivalent to children. Observe that however 
distasteful and humiliating lessers may find these gentle 
prerogatives to be, they must give second thought to openly 
expressing displeasure, for whosoever extends benign concern 
is free to quickly change his tack and show the other side of 
his power. 
VI Allow here a brief review. Social situations were defined as arenas of mutual monitoring. It is possible 
for the student to take social situations very seriously as one 
natural vantage point from which to view all of social life. 
After all, it is in social situations that individuals can 
communicate in the fullest sense of the term, and it is only in 
them that individuals can physically coerce one another, 
assault one another, interact sexually, importune one another 
5 Time, May 1, 1972, p. 60; I leave unconsidered the role of such 
tales in Time's fashioning of stories. 
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gesturally, give physical comfort, and so forth. Moreover, it is 
in social situations that most of the world's work gets done. 
Understandably, in all societies modes of adaptation are 
found, including systems of normative constraint, for 
managing the risks and opportunities specific to social 
situations. 
Our immediate interest in social situations was that it is 
mainly in such contexts that individuals can use their faces 
and bodies, as well as small materials at hand to engage in 
social portraiture. It is here in these small, local places that 
they can arrange themselves microecologically to depict what 
is taken as their place in the wider social frame, allowing 
them, in turn, to celebrate what has been depicted. It is here, 
in social situations, that the individual can signify what he 
takes to be his social identity and here indicate his feelings 
and intent-all of which information the others in the 
gathering will need in order to manage their own courses of 
action-which knowledgeability he in turn must count on in 
carrying out his own designs. 
Now it seems to me that any form of socialization which 
in effect addresses itself to social situations as such, that is, 
to the resources ordinarily available in any social situation 
whatsoever, will have a very powerful effect upon social life. 
In any particular social gathering at any particular moment, 
the effect of this socialization may be slight-no more 
consequence, say, than to modify the style in which matters 
at hand proceed. (After all, whether you light your own 
cigarette or have it I it for you, you can still get lung cancer. 
And whether your job termination interview is conducted 
with delicacy or abruptness, you've still lost your job.) 
However, routinely the question is that of whose opinion is 
voiced most frequently and most forcibly, who makes the 
minor ongoing decisions apparently required for the co-
ordination of any joint activity, and whose passing concerns 
are given the most weight. And however trivial some of these 
little gains and losses may appear to be, by summing them all 
up across all the social situations in which they occur, one 
can see that their total effect is enormous. The expression of 
subordination and domination through this swarm of situa-
tional means is more than a mere tracing or symbol or 
ritualistic affirmation of the social hierarchy. These expres-
sions considerably constitute the hierarchy; they are the 
shadow and the substance. 6 
And here gender styles qualify. For these behavioral styles 
can be employed in a:ny social situation, and there receive 
their small due. When mommies and daddies decide on what 
to teach their little J ohnnys and Marys, they make exactly 
the right choice; they act in effect with much more 
sociological sophistication than they ought to have-
assuming, of course, that the world as we have known it is 
what they want to reproduce. 
And behavioral style itself? Not very stylish. A means of 
making assumptions about life palpable in social situations. 
At the same time, a choreography through which participants 
6 A recent suggestion along this line can be found in the effort to 
specify in detail the difference between college men and women in 
regard to sequencing in cross-sexed conversation. See Zimmerman and 
West (1975), Fishman (1975), and West and Zimmerman (1975). The 
last discusses some similarities between parent-child and adult 
male-female conversational practices. 
present their alignments to situated activities in progress. 
And the stylings themselves consist of those arrangements of 
the human form and those elaborations of human action that 
can be displayed across many social settings, in each case 
drawing on local resources to tell stories of very wide appeal. 
VII I conclude with a sermon. There is a wide agreement that fishes live in the sea 
because they cannot breathe on land, and that we live on 
land because we cannot breathe in the sea. This proximate, 
everyday account can be spelled out in ever increasing 
physiological detail, and exceptional cases and circumstances 
uncovered, but the general answer will ordinarily suffice, 
namely, an appeal to the nature of the beast, to the givens 
and conditions of his existence, and a guileless use of the 
term "because." Note, in this happy bit of folk wisdom-as 
sound and scientific surely as it needs to be-the land and sea 
can be taken as there prior to fishes and men, and 
not-contrary to genesis-put there so that fishes and men, 
when they arrived, would find a suitable place awaiting them. 
This lesson about the men and the fishes contains, I think, 
the essence of our most common and most basic way of 
thinking about ourselves: an accounting of what occurs by an 
appeal to our "natures," an appeal to the very conditions of 
our being. Note, we can use this formula both for categories 
of persons and for particular individuals. Just as we account 
for the fact that a man walks upright by an appeal to his 
nature, so we can account for why a particular amputee 
doesn't by an appeal to his particular conditions of being. 
It is, of course, hardly possible to imagine a society whose 
members do not routinely read from what is available to the 
senses to something larger, distal, or hidden. Survival is 
unthinkable without it. Correspondingly, there is a very deep 
belief in our society, as presumably there is in others, that an 
object produces signs that are informing about it. Objects are 
thought to structure the environment immediately around -
themselves; they cast a shadow, heat up the surround, strew 
indications, leave an imprint; they impress a part picture of 
themselves, a portrait that is unintended and not dependent 
on being attended, yet, of course, informing nonetheless to 
whomsoever is properly placed, trained, and inclined. · 
Presumably this indicating is done in a malleable surround of 
some kind-a field for indications-the actual perturbations 
in which is the sign. Presumably one deals here with "natural 
indexical signs," sometimes having "iconic" features. In any 
case, this sort of indicating is to be seen neither as physical 
instrumental action in the fullest sense, nor as communica-
tion as such, but something else, a kind of by-production, an 
overflowing, a tell-tale soiling of the environment wherever 
the object has been. Although these signs are likely to be 
distinct from, or only a part of, the object about which they 
provide information, it is their configuration which counts, 
and the ultimate source of this, it is felt, is the object itself in 
some independence of the particular field in which the 
expression happens to occur. Thus we take sign production 
to be situationally phrased but not situationally determined. 
The natural indexical signs given off by objects we call 
animal (including, and principally, man) are often called 
"expressions," but in the sense of that term here imp I ied, our 
imagery still allows that a material process is involved, not 
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conventional symbolic communication. We tend to believe 
that these special objects not only give off natural signs, but 
do so more than do other objects. Indeed, the emotions, in 
association with various bodily organs through which 
emotions most markedly appear, are considered veritable 
engines of expression. As a corollary, we assume that among 
humans a very wide range of attributes are expressible: 
intent, feeling, relationship, information state, health, social 
class, etc. Lore and advice concern ing these signs, including 
how to fake them and how to see behind fake ries, constitute 
a kind of folk science. All of these beliefs regarding man, 
taken together, can be referred to as the doctrine pf natural 
expression. / 
It is generally believed that although signs can be read for 
what is merely momentarily or incidentally true _of the object 
producing them- as, say, when an elevated temperature 
indicates a fever-we routinely seek another kind of informa-
tion also, namely, information about those of an object's 
properties that are felt to be perduring1 overall, and 
structurally basic , in short, information about its character or 
''essential nature." (The same sort of information is sought 
about classes of objects.) We do so for many reasons, and in 
so doing presume that objects (and classes of objects) have 
natures independent of the particular interest that might 
arouse our concern. Signs viewed in this light, I will call 
((essential," and the belief that they exist and can be read 
and that individuals give them off is part of the doctrine of 
natural expression. Note again, that although some of these 
attributes) such as passing mood, particular intent, etc. 1 are 
not themselves taken as characteristic) the tendency to 
possess such states and concerns is seen as an essential 
attribute) and conveying evidence of internal states in a 
particular manner can be seen as characteristic. In· fact, there 
seems to be no incidental contingent expression that can't be 
taken as evidence of an essential attribute; we need only see 
that to respond in a particular way to particular circum-
stances is what might be expected in general of persons as 
such or a certain kind of person or a particular person. Note, 
any property seen as unique to a particular person is likely 
also to serve as a means of characterizing him. A corollary is 
that the absence in him of a particular property seen as 
common to the class of which he is a member tends to serve 
similarly. 
Here let me restate the notion that one of the most deeply 
seated traits of man, it is felt1 is gender; femininity and 
masculinity are in a sense the prototypes of essential 
expression-something that can be conveyed fleetingly in any 
social situation and yet something that strikes at the most 
basic characterization of the individual. 
But, of course, when one tries to use the notion that 
human objects give off natural indexical signs and that some 
of these expressions can inform us about the essential nature 
of their producer, matters get complicated. The human 
objects themselves employ the term ((expression," and 
conduct themselves to fit their own conceptions of ex-
pressivity; iconicity especially abounds, doing so because it 
has been made to. Instead of our merely obtaining ex-
pressions of the object, the object obligingly gives them to 
us, conveying them through ritualizations and communica-
ting them through symbols. (But then it can be said that this 
giving itself has unintended expressive features: for it does 
not seem possible for a message to be transmitted without 
the transmitter and the transmission process blindly leaving 
traces of themselves on whatever gets transmitted.) 
There is, straight off, the obvious fact that an individual 
can fake an expression for what can be gained thereby; an 
individual is unlikely to cut off his leg so as to have a nature 
unsuitable for military service, but he might indeed sacrifice 
a toe or affect a limp. In which case "because of" becomes 
11 in order to." But that is really a minor matter; there are 
more serious difficulties. I mention three. 
First, it is not so much the character or overall structure 
of an entity that gets expressed (if such there be), but rather 
particular, situationally-bound features relevant to the 
viewer. (Sometimes, for example, no more than that the 
object is such a one and not another.) The notion of essence, 
character, structure, is, one might argue, social, since there 
are likely to be an infinite number of properties of the object 
that could be selected out as the central ones, and, 
furthermore, often an infinite number of ways of bounding 
the object from other ones. Thus, as suggested, an attribute 
which allows us to distinguish its possessor from those he is 
seen amongst is likely to enter strongly in our characteriza-
tion of him. 
Second, expression in the main is not instinctive but 
socially learned and socially patterned; it is a socially defined 
category which employs a particular expression, and a 
socially established schedule which determines when these 
expressions will occur. And this is so even though individuals 
come to employ expressions in what is sensed to be a 
spontaneous and unselfconscious way, that is, uncalculated, 
unfaked, natural. Furthermore, individuals do not merel y 
learn how and when to express themselves, for in learning 
this they are learning to be the kind of object to which the 
doctrine of natural expression applies, if fallably; they are 
learning to be objects that have a character, that express this 
character, and for whom this characterological expressing is 
only natural. We are socialized to confirm our own hypo-
theses about our natures. 
Third, social situations turn out to be more than a 
convenient field of what we take to be natural expression; 
these configurations are intrinsically, not merely incidentally, 
a consequence of what can be generated in social situations. 
So our concern as students ought not to be in uncovering 
real, natural expressions, whatever they might be. One should 
not appeal to the doctrine of natural expression in an 
attempt to account for natural expression, for that (as is 
said) would conclude the analysis before it had begun. These 
acts and appearances are likely to be anything but natural 
indexical signs, except insofar as they provide indications of 
the actor's interest in qonducting himself effectively under 
conditions of being treated in accordance with the doctrine 
of natural expression. And insofar as natural expressions of 
gender are- in the sense here employed- natural and expres-
sive, what they naturally express is the capacity and 
inclination of individuals to portray a version of themselves 
and their relationships at strategic moments- a working 
agreement to present each other with, and facilitate the 
other's presentation of, gestural pictures of the claimed 
reality of their relationship and the claimed character of their 
human nature. The competency to produce these portraits, 
and interpret those produced by others, might be said to be 
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essential to our nature, but this competency may provide a 
very poor picture of the overall relationship between the 
sexes. And indeed, I think it does. What the relationship 
between the sexes objectively is, taken as a whole, is quite 
another matter, not yet well analyzed. 
What the human nature of males and females really 
consists of, then, is a capacity to learn to provide and to read 
depictions of masculinity and femininity and a willingness to 
adhere to a schedule for presenting these pictures, and this 
capacity they have by virtue of being persons, not females or 
males. One might just as well say there is no gender identity. 
There is only a schedule for the portrayal of gender. There is 
no relationship between the sexes that can so far be 
characterized in any satisfactory fashion. There is only 
evidence of the practice between the sexes of choreographing 
behaviorally a portrait of relationship. And what these 
portraits most directly tell us about is not gender, or the 
overall relationship between the sexes, but about the special 
character and functioning of portraiture. 
One can say that female behavioral style "expresses" 
femininity in the sense of providing an incidental, gratuitous 
portrait. But Durkheim recommends that such expression is a 
political ceremony, in this case affirming the place that 
persons of the female sex-class have in the social structure, in 
other words, holding them to it. And ethologists recommend 
that feminine expression is an indication of the alignment a 
person of the female sex class proposes to take (or accept) in 
the activity immediately to follow-an alignment which does 
not merely express subordination but in part constitutes it. 
The first points out the stabilizing influence of worshipping 
one's place in the social scheme of things, the second, the 
substantial consequences of minor allocations. Both these 
modes of functioning are concealed from us by the doctrine 
of natural expression; for that doctrine teaches us that 
expressions occur simply because it is only natural for them 
to do so- no other reason being required. Moreover, we are 
led to accept as a portrait of the whole something that 
actually occurs at scheduled moments only, something that 
provides (in the case under question) a reflection not of the 
differential nature of persons in the two sex classes but of 
their common readiness to subscribe to the conventions of 
display. 
Gender displays, like other rituals, can iconically reflect 
fundamental features of the social structure; but just as 
easily, these expressions can counterbalance substantive 
arrangements and compensate for them. If anything, then, 
displays are a symptom, not a portrait. For, in fact, whatever 
the fundamental circumstances of those who happen to be in 
the same social situation, their behavioral styles can affirm a 
contrary picture. 
Of course, it is apparent that the niceties of gender 
etiquette provide a solution for various organizational prob-
lems found in social situations-such as who is to make minor 
decisions which seem better lost than unresolved, who is to 
give way, who to step forward, who is to follow who to lead 
so that turns, stops, and moving about can be' coordinated: 
and beginnings and endings synchronized. (In the same way, 
at the substantive level, the traditional division of labor 
between the sexes provides a workable solution to the 
organization of certain personal services, the ones we call 
domestic; similarly, sex-biased linguistic practices, such as the 
use of "he" as the unmarked relative pronoun for "individ-
ual"-amply illustrated in this paper-provide a basis for 
unthinkingly concerted usage upon whiCh the efficiency of 
language depends.) But just why gender instead of some 
other attribute is invoked to deal with these organizational 
problems, and how well adapted gender is for doing so, is an 
open question. 
In sum, gender, in close connection with age-grade, lays 
down more, perhaps, than class and other social divisions an 
understanding of what our ultimate nature ought to be and 
how and where this nature ought to be exhibited. And we 
acquire a vast corpus of accounts to be used as a source of 
good, self-sufficient reasons for many of our acts (particu-
larly as these determine the allocation of minor indulgences 
and deprivations), just as others acquire a sovereign means of 
accounting for our own behavior. Observe, there is nothing 
superficial about this accounting. Given our stereotypes of 
femininity, a particular woman will find that the way has 
been cleared to fall back on the situation of her entire sex to 
account to herself for why she should refrain from vying 
with men in matters mechanical, financial, political, and so 
forth. Just as a particular man will find that his failure to 
exert priority over women in these matters reflects on him 
personally, giving him warrant for insisting on success in 
these connections. (Correspondingly, he can decline domestic 
tasks on the general ground of his sex, while identifying any 
of his wife's disinclination here as an expression of her 
particular character.) Because these stereotypes begin to be 
applied by and to the individual from the earliest years, the 
accounting it affords is rather well implanted. 
I have here taken a functionalist view of gender display 
and have argued that what, if anything, characterizes persons 
as sex-class members is their competence and willingness to 
sustain an appropriate schedule of displays; only the content 
of the displays distinguishes the classes. Although this view 
can be seen as slighting the biological reality of sex, it should 
not be taken as belittling the role of these displays in social 
life. For the facilitation of these enactments runs so deeply 
into the organization of society as to deny any slighting view 
of them. Gender expressions are by way of being a mere 
show; but a considerable amount of the substance of society 
is enrolled in the staging of it. 
Nor should too easy a political lesson be drawn by those 
sympathetic to social change. The analysis of sexism can start 
with obviously unjust discriminations against persons of the 
female sex-class, but analysis as such cannot stop there. 
Gender stereotypes run in every direction, and almost as 
much inform what supporters of women's rights approve as 
what they disapprove. A principal means men in our society 
have for initiating or terminating an everyday encounter on a 
sympathetic note is to employ endearing terms of address 
and verbal expressions of concern that are (upon examina-
tion) parental in character and profoundly asymmetrical. 
Similarly, an important ritual available for displaying af-
fectionate concern, emphasizing junctures in discourse, and 
marking differential conversational exclusiveness is the laying 
on of the hand, ordinarily an unreciprocatable gesture of 
male to female or subordinate male. 
In all of this, intimacy certainly brings no corrective. In 
our society in all classes the tenderest expression of affection 
involves displays that are politically questionable, the place 
76 STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION 
taken up in them by the female being differentiated from 
and reciprocal to the place taken up by the male. Cross-sex 
affectional gestures choreograph protector and protected, 
embracer and embraced, comforter and comforted, supporter 
and supported, extender of affection and recipient thereof; 
and it is defined as only natural that the male encompass and 
the female be encompassed. And this can only remind us that 
male domination is a very special kind, a domination that can 
be carried right into the gentlest, most loving moment 
without apparently causing strain-indeed, these moments 
can hardly be conceived of apart from these asymmetries. 
Whereas other disadvantaged groups can turn from the world 
to a domestic scene where self-determination and relief from 
inequality are possible, the disadvantage that persons who are 
female suffer precludes this; the places identified in our 
society as ones that can be arranged to suit oneself are 
nonetheless for women thoroughly organized along disad-
vantageous lines. 
And indeed, reliance on the child-parent complex as a 
source of display imagery is a means of extending intimate 
comfortable practices outward from their source to the 
world, and in the wake of this domestication, this only 
gentling of the world we seem to have, female subordination 
follows. Any scene, it appears, can be defined as an occasion 
for the depiction of gender difference, and in any scene a 
resource can be found for effecting this display. 
As for the doctrine of expression, it raises the issue of 
professional, as well as folk, analysis. To accept various 
"expressions" of femininity (or masculinity} as indicating 
something biological or social-structural that lies behind or 
underneath these signs, something to be glimpsed through 
them, is perhaps to accept a lay theory of signs. That a 
multitude of "genderisms" point convergently in the same 
direction might only tell us how these signs function socially, 
namely, to support belief that there is an underlying reality 
to gender. Nothing dictates that should we dig and poke 
behind these images we can expect to find anything 
there- except, of course, the inducement to entertain this 
expectation. 
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